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Game theory modelling of retail marketing discount strategies  
 
Purpose  
 
The use of game theory combined with Monte Carlo simulation modelling to support 
the analysis of different retail marketing strategies, in particular the use of payoff 
matrices for modelling the likely outcomes from different retail marketing strategies. 
 
Design/methodology/approach 
 
Theoretical research was utilised to develop a practical approach for applying game 
theory to retail marketing strategies via payoff matrices combined with Monte Carlo 
simulation modelling. 
 
Findings  
 
Game theory combined with Monte Carlo simulation modelling can provide a formal 
approach to understanding consumer decision making in a retail environment, which 
can support the development of retail marketing strategies.  
 
Research limitations/implications  
 
Game theory combined with Monte Carlo simulation modelling can support the 
modelling of the interaction between retail marketing actions and consumer responses 
in a practical formal probabilistic manner, which can inform marketing strategies used 
by retail companies in a practical manner. 
 
Practical implications  
 
Game theory combined with Monte Carlo simulation modelling can provide a 
formalised mechanism for examining how consumers may respond to different retail 
marketing strategies. 
 
Originality/value  
 
The originality of this research is the practical application of game theory to retail 
marketing, in particular the use of payoff matrices combined with Monte Carlo 
simulation modelling to examine likely consumer behaviour in response to different 
retail marketing approaches. 
 
Keywords:  Retail marketing, game theory, modelling 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Yi and Yoo (2011) commented that consumers are exposed to a flood of frequent 
sales promotion practices such as everyday low price, seasonal price off, special price 
discount, free gift, buy one get one free, and other promotions in their daily lives. 
Iranmanesh et al (2017) stated that perceived savings positively affect consumers’ 
intention to purchase products with regard to volume discounts. Scriven et al (2017) 
commented that the tendency for consumers to buy on promotion relates mostly to 
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how much promotion is available in a given category of product. The extent of 
promotion can be so high that as many as half of all brand buyers buy the brand solely 
when it is on promotion. 
 
In this paper, we examine how game theory, a branch of decision mathematics, can be 
applied to retail marketing management in a practical manner that can be applied in 
professional practice. The modelling approach involved obtaining lower boundary 
values and upper boundary values to form a confidence interval. By confidence 
interval in this context is meant the range of values that a marketing professional 
might subjectively assign to a particular measure of a given variable used for 
marketing based upon experience, or the confidence interval of a given variable that 
might result from a sample marketing survey. Ghadge et al (2013) stated the benefits 
of combining game theory and simulation modelling in the field of supply chain 
management. The modelling approach then used this information to model the likely 
distribution of values using Monte Carlo simulation (Narayanan, 2013). This 
simulation approach can be applied to the payoff matrix, in order to determine the 
likelihood of profitable outcomes from multi-buy discounting at a particular level. 
This approach enables the marketing professional to simulate consumer responses to 
different potential discount factors using game theory, based upon previous 
experience or samples of market survey data.  
 
In particular, we examine how payoff matrices combined with Monte Carlo 
simulation modelling can be used to analyse the likely outcomes resulting from 
different retail marketing strategies. In a simplified scenario, involving one retailer 
and a consumer, payoff matrices visually represents the consumer purchasing decision 
making process in a two dimensional grid structure. One axis or dimension of a payoff 
matrix can represent the retail company’s actions and the other the consumer 
response. In actual commercial practice, this might not be a constant sum game in that 
any gains made by one party are at the expense of the other. A retailer strategy might 
be to increase the number of consumers so that any discounts offered are more than 
offset by the increase in sales and so lead to a greater profit for the retailer and 
reduced costs for the consumer (Anderson, 2011). The cells within the payoff matrix 
represent the purchasing outcomes reached depending on which decisions were made 
by the retailer and the consumer.  
 
The rationale for applying game theory to retail marketing strategy management is 
that it can provide an approach to modelling, describing and documenting the likely 
outcomes from different retail marketing strategies. Game theory can provide a more 
formalised mechanism for examining how consumers may respond to different retail 
marketing strategies. This provides a basis for a more formalised analysis of likely 
outcomes from different retail marketing strategies in a practical manner that can be 
applied in professional practice. In addition, the use of confidence intervals and 
Monte Carlo simulation modelling to simulate the likely consumer actions in response 
to different discounting factors can avoid many of the problems inherent in simply 
reporting the statistical significance of a test statistic that might be used for marketing 
modelling. A confidence interval focuses on what the effect is, rather than what it is 
not. If the lower bound of the confidence interval exceeds the value predicted by the 
null hypothesis (e.g. a correlation exceeds 0.0) it can be concluded with a specified 
level of certainty that the effect is real (i.e. exists in the population) (Newton and 
Rudestam, 1999). Confidence intervals applied in the game theory simulation of 
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consumer actions in response to different discounting factors can aid in modelling and 
understating the effects of different discounting approaches. 
 
The research described in this paper concerns the use of game theory in the specific 
area of retail marketing discounting, and in particular, limited research in terms of 
actual practical application in professional marketing practice. The originality of this 
research is the practical application of game theory to retail marketing, in particular 
the use of payoff matrices combined with simulation modelling to examine likely 
consumer behaviour in response to different retail marketing approaches. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
2.1 Game theory 
 
Game theory can be considered to have as its origins the publication of Augustin 
Cournot’s Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth 
(Cournot, 1897). This attempted to explain the underlying rules governing the 
behaviour of duopolies (where only two sellers exist in one market, although, in 
practice, the term is also used where two companies have dominant control over a 
market). Research into game theory initially evolved as a branch of economics (Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). Game theory concerns the mathematical study of 
the decision making process (Davis, 1983) and can model how individuals may 
behave in specific circumstances that resemble simple types of games, allowing an 
examination of the relationships between decisions and outcomes.  
 
Game theory includes the concept of utility, which concerns a mathematical measure 
of player satisfaction (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). In games that involve a 
deterministic function between decision and outcome, there can be a utility value 
assigned to the outcome of each decision. A Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1951) concerns 
a situation when the game players cannot improve their payoff by independently 
changing their strategy. This means that it is the best strategy assuming the other 
game player has chosen a strategy and will not change it (Goldfarb et al, 2012). The 
Nash equilibrium will be reached when the best rewards are obtained after the game 
occurs (Neslin and Greenhalgh, 1983; Sanchez-Torres et al, 2018). 
 
The saddle point property is a game theory concept that concerns the choices of game 
players that lead to the same result (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944; 
Ngendakuriyo and Taboubi, 2017). A payoff matrix (Dahlstrom et al, 2014) visually 
represents the decision making process involved in a game in a grid structure. One 
axis of the payoff matrix represents one player's decision. The other axis of the payoff 
matrix represents the other player's decision. The cells within the payoff matrix 
represent the outcomes reached depending on which decisions were made by the 
players concerned. For a general two-player zero-sum game, for a saddle point to 
exist, the payoff matrix would need to include an element that is both a minimum of 
its row and a maximum of its column (Jadlovska and Hrubina, 2011).  
 
2.2 Retail marketing strategy modelling 
 
Marketing science combines a variety of academic fields such as economics, statistics, 
econometrics and psychology (Hsu et al, 2012; Weber et al, 2018). However, 
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typically, empirical examination of the impact of marketing science on actual 
commercial practice is somewhat rare (Roberts et al, 2014). Pricing is that element of 
a firm's marketing mix that focuses on generating value to the company in the form of 
revenues (Venkatesh, 2010). Retail marketing approaches such as multi-buy offers 
may be used in response to similar approaches by competitor retailers (Patterson et al, 
2011), to address reducing sales volumes, or reducing profits, or to potentially expand 
the customer base (Maxwell et al, 2012). Traditionally, sales promotions are regarded 
as a technique that brings about direct sales increases (Yi and Yoo, 2011). Cain 
(2014) commented that incremental sales volume is essentially short run in nature, 
capturing the period-to-period sales variation driven by temporary selling price, multi-
buy promotions and off- and online media activity. These can be converted into 
incremental revenues or profits, and benchmarked against costs to calculate return on 
investment for to each element of the marketing mix. Philander (2016) commented 
that in order to de-seasonalize demand and to stimulate short-term sales, companies 
may frequently use undifferentiated marketing tools such as price discounts and other 
promotions. 
 
Chen et al (2012) stated there can be a tendency among consumers to neglect base 
values when processing percentage change information when evaluating economically 
equivalent offers presented in percentage terms, such as bonus packs and price 
discounts. Liu and Chou (2015) argued that a free gift promotion typically lowers 
consumers' willingness to pay for the target product compared with a price bundle 
promotion. 
 
Retail marketing approaches such as multi-buy offers may be undertaken locally, 
regionally, nationally or even internationally. Typically, a pilot approach in a local 
area may be useful to assess the potential of the approach before moving on to larger 
scale implementation (Palazon and Delgado-Ballester, 2009; Pratten, 2006). 
Typically, the modelling of marketing approaches such as multi-buy offers and 
analysis of their potential and actual effectiveness would be undertaken by marketing 
analysts, managers or directors (Gamliel and Herstein, 2011). Balachande and Ghosh 
(2013) commented that the act of multi-buying can significantly reduce churn (the 
consumer’s subsequent decision to terminate their relationship with the company) 
even though customers who are more predisposed to multi-buy have an inherently 
higher predisposition to churn. 
 
If consumers are exposed to continuous sales promotions, such promotions should be 
regarded as more than just a tool for sales increases. As marketers may spend a 
considerable amount of funds on sales promotions, it is important to understand the 
effects of such sales promotions (Yi and Yoo, 2011). Thomadsen et al (2012) 
commented that marketers need to learn about individual consumers in order to better 
price-discriminate. In terms of mathematical modelling, companies routinely use 
customers' purchase-history data to better understand and learn about customers' 
preferences and use this information to optimize future prices.  
 
Confidence intervals (Cheema et al, 2012) can provide assessments of the range of 
values that a marketing professional might subjectively assign to a particular measure 
of a given variable used for marketing modelling. This might be based upon 
experience, or estimates might be made of the range of likely values of a given 
variable from sample marketing survey data using the sample mean and sample 
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standard deviation. However, Brenner, et al (1996) commented that judgements of 
confidence and estimates of relative frequency can be practically indistinguishable. 
Furthermore, Kahneman, and Tversky (1996) stated that judgments of frequency (and 
not only subjective probabilities) can be susceptible to large and systematic biases. 
This is important for marketing strategy development in that marketing professionals 
need to be careful with regard to selecting appropriate samples of marketing survey 
data, and appreciating that there will always be variability within and between 
samples. 
 
2.3 Game theory for retail marketing 
 
Game theory can be used to examine the relationships between decisions and 
outcomes in the process of playing a game. Sanchez-Torres et al (2018) examined the 
use of game theory for email marketing strategies. The interactivity between actions 
and outcomes can be used to model consumer behaviour (Kim et al 2014). A game 
theory view of retail consumer behaviour can involve viewing consumer purchases as 
a series of strategic decisions made by the consumer (Jiang, and Srinivasan, 2016). 
However, theoretical predictions can be sensitive to the details of the modelling 
assumptions, that can make general predictions elusive. A trade-off exists between the 
generality of modelling assumptions and the usefulness of the resulting insights in 
answering questions in a specific organisational situation (Thomadsen et al, 2012).  
 
Bronnenberg et al (2008) commented that despite the growing amount of empirical 
literature concerning dynamic consumer behaviour, little research has been 
undertaken with regard to the implications of choice dynamics for marketing decision-
makers. The incorporation of game theory into marketing models has the potential to 
enrich the scope of marketing modelling (Mudambi, 1996). For example, the use of 
temporary discounts to control the evolution in the distribution of consumers’ 
willingness-to-pay and to price-discriminate over time. Game theory can be used to 
analyse the actions and outcomes of consumers in terms of the likelihood of being 
willing to pay for a given product when different temporary discounts are applied. By 
analysing the consumer actions and outcomes over a set of different temporary 
discounts, models of likely consumer responses to different discounting approaches 
can be developed. Doherty and Delener (2001) stated the need for multiple marketing 
strategies and approaches for estimating the likelihood of their success.  
 
Game theory can be used to analyse the likely outcomes resulting from different retail 
marketing strategies adopted by an organisation. However, as Anderson (2011) stated, 
the most basic game theory concepts, such as the zero-sum game, which describes 
conditions in which each gain by one player produces an equal and corresponding loss 
for the other may have limited applicability to marketing. This is because marketing 
can produce dividends for both players when the right message reaches the right 
audience at the right time. Meyer et al (2010) stated that greater convergence of game 
theoretic modelling and behavioural research in marketing would lead to new insights 
for both fields. 
 
3. Research methodology 
 
The research reported in this paper involved a multi-disciplinary literature review 
concerning game theory mathematical modelling, simulation modelling of marketing 
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approaches, and marketing strategies used within the retail sector. Theoretical 
research was utilised to develop a practical approach for applying game theory to 
retail marketing strategies via payoff matrices combined with simulation modelling. 
Payoff matrices combined with Monte Carlo simulation modelling can provide a 
method of formal probabilistic mathematical modelling of the likely outcomes in 
terms of consumer responses (or opponent player game moves) to retailer actions (or 
player game moves). A confidence interval represents the probable minimum value 
and maximum value in the population of interest. The confidence interval concerns 
the likelihood, expressed as a percentage, of the average value of a variable being 
between a lower boundary and upper boundary value. Thomadsen (2012) commented 
that a key ingredient of any game-theoretic model is the information each of the game 
players possesses (these can be termed games of imperfect or incomplete 
information). In a market setting, the consumer typically needs to assess the pricing of 
a product before purchase. 
 
A key question associated with the use of payoff matrices in game theory is how are 
the payoffs determined. In this paper, we describe a methodology based on 
established practices within (PERT) Program Evaluation and Review Technique (used 
in Critical Path Analysis). The approach requires that marketing staff be able to 
provide maximum and minimum values for each payoff. Monte Carlo simulation is 
then employed to simulate payoff tables that are then solved in the usual way, 
obtaining mixed strategies. A mixed strategy is a probability distribution over the set 
of actions that a player might make. The method is repeated many times in order to 
provide probability distributions for each player’s overall optimal strategies. Finally 
these distributions are then used to assess how robust the strategies are and so give an 
estimate of the risk associated with the game situation. 
 
The game theoretic approach combined with simulation modelling of retail marketing 
approaches described in this paper is demonstrated by modelling the game play 
resulting from the pricing level used in a multi-buy sales offer by a retailer and the 
cumulative responses from a set of consumers. This approach offers a rigorous 
probabilistic modelling technique that is able to be applied in professional commercial 
practice. This is an important area of research since game theory can support the 
modelling of the interaction between retail marketing actions and consumer responses 
in a formal probabilistic and practical manner, which can inform marketing strategies 
used by retail companies. 
 
4. Research Results 
 
4.1 Game theory for retail marketing 
 
4.1.1 Game theory concept of utility for retail marketing  
 
The game theory concept of utility (a mathematical measure of player satisfaction) 
can be incorporated into the analysis of retail marketing strategies by considering 
consumer satisfaction (Carter and Curry, 2010). This can be conceptualised as relating 
to there being an appropriate variety of purchasing options for the consumer, and 
whether the consumer feels that they have ‘won’ in some manner with regard to a 
given purchase in a multi-buy sales offer or similar situation. However, statements of 
consumer satisfaction after a purchase might be a rather rough guide to actual utility 
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since consumers might forget what other options were available, and might post-
justify their behaviour.  
 
4.1.2 Game theory concept of the saddle point property for retail marketing 
 
The game theory concept of the saddle point property concerns the choices of game 
players that lead to the same result (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). A saddle 
point in retail marketing activities can be conceptualised as an equilibrium in 
discounting and consumer purchasing (Anderson, 2010). For the retailer, this concerns 
what can be termed a minimax strategy, with the solution being the saddle point 
(Ormerod, 2010). From the retailer viewpoint, the retailer is minimizing the maximum 
amount that can be lost through discounting. For the consumer the minimax strategy 
concerns maximising the amount that can be gained from the minimum amount of 
purchases of discounted items. However, not all marketing discounting situations may 
have saddle points, since consumers may not respond to particular discounting 
approaches. 
 
4.1.3 Payoff matrices for retail marketing 
 
A payoff matrix is a visual representation of all the possible outcomes that can occur 
when two individuals make a strategic decision. One axis of the payoff matrix can 
represent the consumer's decision. The other axis of the payoff matrix can represent 
the strategy adopted by the retail company. The cells within payoff matrix can 
represent the outcomes that depend upon the consumer and retail company player 
decisions.  
 
Payoff matrices might initially be developed by marketing staff in terms of initial 
estimates values. However, it would be more practicable to develop confidence 
intervals based upon sampling from consumer surveys using the sample mean and 
sample standard deviation, in order to attempt to ensure that the payoff matrices 
represent a statistically representative assessment of likely consumer purchase 
outcomes. Dyner and Franco (2004) commented upon the typical quantity and quality 
of the information that is available in marketing decision-making processes. 
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Consumer 
 Multi-buy 
purchase 
Single 
purchase 
 
Low 
pricing 
 
(profit p1, 
saving s1) 
 
 
(profit p2, 
saving s2) 
 
High 
pricing 
 
(profit p3, 
saving s3) 
 
 
(profit p4, 
saving s4) 
 
 
Table 1. Multi-buy payoff matrix. 
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Table 1. shows a simplified payoff matrix representing the outcomes from a multi-buy 
offer by a retail company for a single consumer transaction. The retail company 
makes a move in the purchasing game equating to a particular marketing strategy (low 
or high pricing of multi-buy goods), which relates to a profit pn. The consumer makes 
a move in the purchasing game equating to multi-buy purchase or single purchase, 
which relates to a saving sn.  
 
The typical dominant game strategies (strategies that always provides greater utility 
(greater worth) to a player, no matter what the other player’s strategy), might be that 
the retail company would chose to always set the pricing of multi-buy goods to 
maximise overall profits, and that the customer would choose the multi-buy option in 
order to maximise savings (assuming that the consumer might require or have use for 
multiple items, which would depend upon the type of product). 
 
It would be assumed that if there is a dominant strategy, then the player would choose 
that strategy. A dominant strategy is a best response to every strategy of the other 
player. In the example above, the two strategies available are S1 – “Low pricing of 
multi-buy goods” and S2 – “High pricing of multi-buy goods”. The retail company 
might choose the “High pricing of multi-buy goods” strategy (S2) over the “Low 
pricing of multi-buy goods” strategy (S1). This decision might arise if the confidence 
interval based upon analysis of sample data from market research surveys indicated 
that it would be likely that there would be sufficient numbers of sales within the 
confidence interval at a high multi-buy price to increase profits overall compared to 
the single purchase price. If the confidence intervals based upon market research 
surveys indicated that this might be unlikely, then the strategy chosen might be the 
low pricing of multi-buy goods, to provide sufficient numbers of sales at a low multi-
buy price to increase profits overall compared to the single purchase price.  
 
However, in actual retail marketing practice, the consumer purchasing game may not 
be a constant (or zero) sum game in the sense that any gains made by the consumer 
are at the expense of the retailer. A retailer marketing strategy might be to increase the 
number of consumers so that multi-buy discounts offered are more than offset by the 
increase in consumer sales that would lead to a greater profit for the retailer and 
reduced costs for the consumer (Anderson, 2011). 
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Competitor retail company 
 Low 
pricing 
High 
pricing 
 
Low pricing 
 
(profit p1, 
competitor 
profit c1) 
 
 
(profit p2, 
competitor 
profit c2) 
 
 
High 
pricing 
 
(profit p3, 
competitor 
profit c3) 
 
 
(profit p4, 
competitor 
profit c4) 
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Table 2. Competitor payoff matrix. 
 
Table 2 shows a simplified payoff matrix representing the outcomes from multi-buy 
offers made by a retail company and a competitor retail company. The retail company 
makes a move in the purchasing game equating to a particular marketing strategy (low 
or high pricing of multi-buy goods). The competitor retail company makes similar 
moves in the purchasing game equating to a change in marketing strategy (low or high 
pricing of multi-buy goods). In simple game theory terms, it would appear that the 
retail company could only “win” (in terms of making more profit than a competitor, or 
increasing market share compared to a competitor) when the multi-buy pricing is set 
higher than that of the competitor retail company. This simplification, however, does 
not take branding, or other marketing issues into consideration. 
 
However, in actual practice retail marketing is somewhat more complex that a simple 
two-player game of retailer versus a single consumer, or a retailer versus a competitor 
retailer. In order to model the complexity inherent in retail marketing in actual 
practice, the payoff matrix concept needs to be viewed in a higher dimension. Thus, 
we need to view the payoff matrix as a ‘cumulative’ representation of a three 
dimensional matrix that incorporates simulation of repeated game play by a large 
number of consumers (Ormerod, 2010), and utilise confidence intervals in order to 
model the likely ranges of outcomes. 
 
The modelling approach used involves obtaining lower boundary and upper boundary 
values for variables of interest either from marketing professionals of from market 
surveys. This information is then used to model the likely distribution of values using 
Monte Carlo simulation. This simulation approach can be applied to the payoff 
matrix, in order to determine the likelihood of profitable outcomes from multi-buy 
discount at a particular level.  
 
Let the standard retail profit on a given item be x and let the discount applied to each 
multi-buy item be d. Therefore, the multi-buy profit per item will be x – d. If market 
research has indicated that the confidence interval of ml to mu items of the given 
product are typically purchased each day, then, there will be values, nl and nu, where: 
 
(nl + ml) (x – d) >  ml x 
 
(nu + mu) (x – d) >  mu x 
 
In other words, based upon the confidence interval of ml to mu items of the given 
product being typically purchased each day the overall profit made from selling nl + 
ml items at a multi-buy discount will be greater than the profit made from selling ml 
items at full price. The overall profit made from selling nu + mu items at a multi-buy 
discount will be greater than the profit made from selling mu items at full price. There 
will be a range of values nl to nu from the simulation modelling which will determine 
if an overall profit is made based upon the estimate of typical number of the given 
product sold per day. In game theory terms, this is when the retail company wins over 
a set of consumers, or wins over a competitor retail company.  
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As an example, if one cotton T-shirt sold for £10, a retailer might wish to simulate the 
likely outcomes of offering a discount of 10%, 15% or 20% if two cotton T-shirts 
were purchased. Monte Carlo simulation was used to simulate cases of consumer 
decisions based upon the different discount levels and anticipated sales levels to 
examine the potential resultant profits. Thus, for example if there was a £4 profit on a 
£10 T-shirt, then a 10% discount on the purchase of two T-shirts (2 for £18) would 
result in £3 profit per T-shirt.  
 
If market research indicated that the confidence interval of the number of items of the 
given product typically purchased each day was within a lower boundary of 100 to an 
upper boundary 120, and the standard profit on the full price item is £4, and the multi-
buy discount is £1, then 
 
(nl + ml) (4 -1) > ml (4)  and  (nu + mu) (4 -1) > mu (4)   
 
(nl + 100) (4 -1) > 100 (4)  and  (nu + 120) (4 -1) > 120 (4)   
 
when nl is greater than 33, i.e. when 33 additional items per day are purchased at the 
discounted price compared to the expected number of items purchased, and when nh is 
greater than 40. Thus, the confidence interval of the additional number of items to be 
sold necessary to increase overall profits would be 33 to 40. 
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Cumulative consumer set confidence 
interval nl + ml to nu + mu 
 
 Multi-buy 
purchase 
Single 
purchase 
 
Low pricing 
 
(profit p1i, 
saving s1i) 
 
 
(profit p2i, 
saving s2i) 
 
High 
pricing 
 
(profit p3i, 
saving s3i) 
 
 
(profit p4i, 
saving s4i) 
 
 
 
Table 3. Cumulative payoff matrix.  
 
Table 3. shows a simple example payoff matrix representing the cumulative outcomes 
from a series of consumer transactions based upon Monte Carlo simulation modelling 
where i represents the values in the confidence interval range from the lower 
boundary (l) to the upper boundary (u). If nl to nu represents the confidence interval of 
the number of additional transactions required to increase overall profit based upon 
simulation of sales of the lower pricing of multi-buy goods, then the retail company 
“wins” in these instances (and would also “win” if there were sufficient numbers of 
transactions at the higher pricing of multi-buy goods). 
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Monte Carlo simulation of consumer decisions (whether single or multi-buy purchase) 
was applied to sales volumes of 100, 120, 130, 140 and 150 per day representing 
potential increases in sales due to discounting. The Monte Carlo simulation involved 
using random numbers to generate different proportions of consumers choosing the 
multi-buy option. This was then repeated for discount levels of 15% and 20% in order 
to examine potential profits. In this manner, simulation of differing anticipated sales 
volumes, and proportions of consumers opting for the multi-buy discount for different 
discount levels can inform marketing staff of the likely outcomes in terms of profits 
for different discounting strategies. 
 
The approach involves marketing staff providing two values for each payoff (a 
maximum and a minimum). Monte Carlo simulation is then employed to simulate 
payoff tables, as per the examples above, which are then solved in the usual way, 
obtaining mixed strategies. The method is repeated numerous times in order to 
provide probability distributions for each player’s overall optimal strategies. Finally 
these distributions are then used to assess how robust the strategies are and so give an 
estimate of the risk associated with the game situation. 
 
Using market research from representative groups of potential consumers, the 
likelihood of consumers making a multi-buy decision at a low multi-buy pricing and a 
higher multi-buy pricing could be examined. If the samples were reasonably 
representative, then, if an estimate of the confidence interval of the size of the typical 
consumer base were available, it would be possible (using the proportions choosing 
the multi-buy options from the sample), to estimate the likely actual numbers of 
multi-buy customers. From this, the range of potential profits from adopting the multi-
pricing strategies could be estimated. If the outcomes from the simulations are robust, 
that is that the likelihood of profitable outcomes appears more likely than not, then a 
multi-buy discount strategy might be justifiable.  
 
In game theory terms of Nash equilibria (Nash, 1951), the best strategy of consumers 
might be to adopt the multi-buy move in response to both the low and high multi-buy 
pricing moves by the retailer. In which case, for the retailer, the best strategy would 
be the high multi-buy pricing.  
 
The consumer would typically always choose the “Low pricing of multi-buy goods” 
for this example, if available (although this may not always be available). However, 
not all purchasing decisions can be predicted in this manner, since there may be no 
dominant strategies. When none of the players in a game has a dominant strategy, we 
should expect players to use strategies that are the best responses to each other. If a 
retail company chooses a strategy S and a set of consumers chooses a strategy T. We 
say that this pair of strategies (S, T) is a Nash equilibrium if S is a best response to T, 
and T is a best response to S. However, there will be marketing approaches that may 
have no Nash equilibria at all. For such marketing approaches, we can make 
predictions about consumers’ behaviour by enlarging the set of strategies to include 
the possibility of randomisation. 
 
Initially, a payoff matrix and the confidence intervals could be estimated by marketing 
staff. However, statistical analysis of data from sample consumer groups (e.g. by 
region or by product category) could be used to determine more reliable confidence 
intervals and probabilities. This can inform the overall retail marketing strategy by 
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providing probability estimates of likely outcomes from consumer purchasing 
decisions, based upon different marketing approaches. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have demonstrated how game theory combined with Monte Carlo 
simulation modelling can be applied to retail marketing activities. Game theory 
combined with Monte Carlo simulation modelling can provide a formal approach to 
understanding consumer decision making in a retail environment, which can support 
the development of retail marketing strategies. Game theory combined with Monte 
Carlo simulation modelling can support the modelling of the interaction between retail 
marketing actions and consumer responses in a practical formal probabilistic manner, 
which can inform marketing strategies used by retail companies in a practical manner. 
 
Payoff matrices combined with Monte Carlo simulation modelling can be used to 
model the probabilities of consumer actions in response to retail marketing 
approaches. The game theory concept of utility (a measure of game player 
satisfaction) can be modelled by considering consumer satisfaction. This can be 
viewed as there being an appropriate variety of purchasing options for the consumer, 
and whether the consumer feels that they have ‘won’ in some manner with regard to a 
given purchase for example with regard to a multi-buy sales offer. If a retail company 
chooses a particular strategy and a set of consumers chooses a given strategy, then this 
pair of strategies would be a Nash equilibrium if they are a best response to each 
other. However, there will be marketing approaches that may have no Nash equilibria 
at all. 
 
Monte Carlo simulation of consumer decisions (whether single or multi-buy purchase) 
can be used to model different sales volumes representing potential increases in sales 
due to different levels of discounting. The Monte Carlo simulation involves using 
random numbers to generate different proportions of consumers choosing the multi-
buy option. The approach involves marketing staff providing two values for each 
payoff (a maximum and a minimum). Monte Carlo simulation is then employed to 
simulate payoff tables. The method is repeated numerous times in order to provide 
probability distributions for each player’s overall optimal strategies. These 
distributions are then used to assess how robust the strategies are and so give an 
estimate of the risk associated with different levels of multi-buy discounting. 
 
 
The originality of the research reported in this paper is a formalised, statistical and 
scientific approach to the practical application of game theory to retail marketing 
strategy development, in particular the use of payoff matrices combined with Monte 
Carlo simulation modelling to model likely consumer behaviour in response to 
different marketing discount approaches. 
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